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This paper assesses the possible contribution of monetary expansions for the existence 
of expansionary fiscal consolidations, using annual panel data for 14 European Union 
countries over the period 1970-2019. The paper adopts a two-fold approach: it combines 
the usual CAPB approach used to identify fiscal consolidations with the narrative 
approach, and extends this approach to include dummy variables for identifying monetary 
expansions. A fiscal consolidation couple with a monetary expansion does produce little 
evidence of non-Keynesian effects, thus, monetary expansions does not contribute for the 
existence of expansionary fiscal consolidations. Moreover, Panel Probit estimations 
suggest monetary developments even contribute negatively for success of fiscal 
consolidations. For other success variables, duration and size contribute in a positive way 
and expenditure based consolidations lead to a decrease in debt to GDP ratio.  
   
KEYWORDS: fiscal consolidations, fiscal episodes, monetary expansion non-
Keynesian effects, panel data, probit 
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MONETARY POLICY EASING AND NON-KEYNESIAN EFFECTS OF FISCAL POLICY 
Gonçalo Quaresma 
THIS WORK ASSESSES THE CONTRIBUTION OF MONETARY EASING TO THE 
EXISTENCE OF EXPANSIONARY FISCAL CONSOLIDATIONS, USING A CAPB 
APPROACH AND A NARRATIVE APPROACH. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Keynesian theory says an increase in government spending should stimulate the 
economy via the multiplier mechanism thus increasing disposable income and private 
consumption. So, a fiscal consolidation should lead to a decrease in private consumption. 
Nevertheless, some cases of non-linear effects in 90s like Denmark and Ireland gave 
rise to the strand of possible non-Keynesian effects of fiscal policy namely during fiscal 
consolidation periods. Accordingly, if there is a FC GDP may expand via private 
consumption or private investment. 
An expansionary fiscal consolidation (EFC) happens when a fiscal consolidation 
leads to an increase in GDP (assuming that consumers adopt a Ricardian behaviour). 
According to literature two channels come at play in the existence of an EFC, 
Consumption channel and Investment channel. 
There exist some conditions to provide success of EFC, being Size and Persistence 
[Giavazzi & Pagano (1996)]; Initial Conditions [Peroti (1999) and Ardagna (2004)] and 
Composition [ Giavazzi (2000)].  
However, some literature questioned the role that monetary policy might potentially 
play in the existence of EFC. Ardgana (2004) even stated: “In this case [referring a fall 
in interest rates], the coefficients of fiscal policy variables can be biased, capturing the 
effect of monetary rather than fiscal policy”. 
Thus, our research question is: Can monetary policy easing explain the existence of 
non-Keynesian effects of fiscal policy? 
Having in mind recent criticisms to CAPB approach, especially those stating that 
CAPB is useless in eliminating the cyclical effects and when CAPB tries to adjust for that 
cyclical effects suffers from measurement errors that are not correlated with economic 
development [Botta (2015)].  
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Thus, our paper contributes to the recent literature that complements the usual CAPB 
approach with the narrative approach developed by Devries et.al. (2011), and the effect 
of monetary expansions on the existence of EFC. 
Overall, we conclude that monetary expansions do not contribute to the existence of 
EFC even using the narrative approach. In terms of success of fiscal consolidations, the 
three dummies accounting for monetary expansions all seem to contribute negatively for 
success of fiscal consolidations based on the evolution of Debt to GDP ratio (accounting 
for initial conditions) and, even some of them, contribute negatively for success of fiscal 
consolidations based on change of CAPB (accounting for size of FC). 
The paper is organized as follows. Section two provides a literature review on the 
conditions needed to provide the existence of EFC and assesses one criticism, monetary 
policy easing effect on the existence of expansionary fiscal consolidations. Section three 
presents and identification of monetary and fiscal episodes and their respective 
relationship. In section four we conduct the empirical analysis of EFC using panel 
estimations, recurring to both the CAPB and narrative approaches and accommodating 
the monetary developments for both, and we also assess the success of the fiscal 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW  
Non-Keynesian effects of fiscal policy  
As Afonso (2010) says “the theoretical possibility of the existence of expansionary 
fiscal consolidations echoed in the so-called “German perspective” of fiscal 
consolidations, expressed in 1981 by the German Council of Economic Experts. Such 
view would afterwards have an influence on the fiscal convergence criteria of the 
Maastricht Treaty, calling for discipline of public accounts as a precondition for stable 
economic growth.”. 
Fiscal Policy may have non-Keynesian effects on private consumption and investment 
decisions, though by different channels at stake in each situation.  
C channel (expectations, wealth and substitution effects) 
First, the expectation channel where lying on Ricardian equivalence agents perceive 
actual public spending cuts as leading to future tax reductions. Thus, they increase their 
consumption today. (Afonso & Leal, 2019) 
Second, fall in interest rates due to the implementation of a fiscal consolidation leads 
to a wealth effect that, together with an increase in assets markets value, and the 
opportunity cost of savings lead households to increase their daily consumption (Afonso 
& Leal, 2019)  
Third, cut in government spending lead to a substitution of public consumption by 
private consumption. Cut in public consumption frees up more economic resources like 
labour force and increases market space leading to an expansion of private sector (Afonso 
& Leal, 2019) 
Giavazzi (1990) analysed the presence of this channels in some countries. They 
described two cases: Denmark (essentially wealth channel and expectations channel at 
stake) and Ireland (expectations channel present in 2nd Irish Stabilization). 
I channel (credibility effect, wage moderation) 
Regarding the effects on private investment two effects are present, wage moderation 
and credibility effect. 
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First, fiscal consolidation may have economic effects via the labour market because 
of reducing public spending mainly salaries, instead of rising taxes, reducing unit labor 
costs what increases external competitiveness and fosters net exports. Ardagna (2004) 
state labor market (wage moderation) channel has being important in transmission of 
fiscal policy. 
Finally, a decrease in government deficits leads to a decrease in sovereign default risk 
what results in a decrease in real interest rate, the so-called credibility effect. Guajardo & 
Yépez (2019) analyse the effect in spreads, fiscal consolidations announcements made by 
congress in episodes when sovereign risk is high have contribute to decrease spread 
specially under an IMF program and high spread countries. Still, they found no evidence 
of EFC. 
Conditions to provide the possibility of EFC: size, persistence, composition, initial 
state of public finances (public debt to GDP) 
Most of the literature agrees that there are some necessary conditions required to 
provide the possibility of EFC. This regarding size, persistence, composition and initial 
state of public finances. 
For example, Giavazzi & Pagano (1996) analyses the effects of budgetary items on 
private consumption and adds Sweden episode of 1989-1984, where large cuts in taxes 
led to a decrease in private C, to the analysis of Giavazzi &Pagano (1990). It argues sharp 
and persistent cuts have non-Keynesian effects. 
Turning to the influence of initial conditions Perotti (1999) analysing OECD countries 
from 1965 to 1994 says the bigger the debt to GDP the more likely is that FC turns out to 
be expansionist, introducing the idea that initial conditions may be determinant for 
success of fiscal consolidation. 
Regarding composition, Giavazzi et.al. (2000) addresses the issue of expansionary 
fiscal consolidations in OECD countries between 1973 until 1996 and for developing 
countries from 1996 to 1995 introducing the idea of composition that FC are expansionary 
when based on tax increases instead of spending cuts, more successful in reducing debt 
to GDP. That is the case for OECD countries. 
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Using data from 17 OECD countries from 195 to 2002, Ardagna (2004) analyses the 
effects of fiscal consolidations on GDP growth and debt ratio. Initial debt to GDP has a 
positive effect on the probability of success of fiscal consolidations. Meanwhile, current 
GDP growth does not seem to drive success of fiscal consolidations. More, the probability 
that a fiscal consolidation leads to decrease in debt to GDP depends more on the size of 
its improvement in CAPB and less on the composition. 
Returning to the effects of budgetary items on private consumption Afonso (2010) 
extends Giavazzi & Pagano (1996) analysis to 15 EU countries from 1970 until 2005. He 
finds evidence of non-Keynesian effects, especially on social transfers. 
In some recent strand of literature, CAPB has been criticised for not being able to 
fully eliminate cyclical shocks. One the first approaches was led by Devries et. al. (2011), 
which created a dataset with policy documents approved in National Parliaments and 
statements from National Central Bank of each country presented, to distinguish cyclical 
component. This dataset was then extended by Gupta et.al. (2017).  Botta (2015) even 
points CAPB as an empirical fragility of expansionary fiscal consolidation advocates. 
According to Alesina & Ardagna (2013), expenditure-based consolidations are the 
best on reducing debt to GDP and private investment is the one that most reacts to this 
type of adjustments using OECD countries from 1970 to 2010. If accompanied by 
structural reforms on labor and goods market, there is no negative effect. Alesina et.al. 
(2013) points differences in supply side policies as being the key of policy mix to 
outweigh negative effects on GDP. These results are even robust to alternative definition 
of episodes such as those used by Devries et. al. (2011). 
Still some recent literature uses narrative approach, like Guajardo et.al.(2014) 
analysing a sample of OECD countries from 1978 to 2009 using CAPB and narrative 
approach to evaluate the effect of consolidations on GDP and private consumption. In 
terms of narrative approach, Guajardo et.al. (2014) finds no evidence of non-Keynesian 
effects, adding that they are contractionary independent of composition.  
Getting back to the effect of budgetary items on private consumption, Afonso & Leal 
(2019) analyse 19 EMU countries from 1960 until 2017, but now using narrative approach 
only to 10 Euro Area countries. They conclude private consumption continues to exhibit 
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non-Keynesian effects. Again, social benefits present a negative long run elasticity 
appearing to contribute the most to non-Keynesian effects. 
More recently, Alesina et.al. (2019) stated again that spending cuts are much less 
costly in terms of output loss than tax increases, this time analysing 16 OECD countries 
from 1978 until 2014.Notably this different effect on output is robust to accompanying 
policies (monetary policy, structural reforms, exchange rates) and state of the economy 
(whether recession or expansion). 
Breuer (2019) develops the idea that in CAPB approach expenditure to GDP behaves 
inversely to output gap, thus, an economic upswing (arising from a positive output gap) 
is wrongly associated with a reduction in government spending. A major implication is 
the fact that fiscal multiplier becomes small or even negative much more for expenditure 
side than revenue side. 
Interestingly, Alesina et.al. (2019) results may suffer from this problem. 
Effect of MP easing on the existence of NK effects of FP 
One of the critics to EFC is that the possibility of non-Keynesian effects may come 
not from Fiscal Policy but from Monetary Policy easing [Botta (2015)]. Foresti & Marani 
(2013) even states that an “expansionary reaction of the Central Bank to a FC can be the 
main cause of the increase in income”. 
According to Ardagna (2004), and using a sample of OECD countries, successful and 
expansionary fiscal consolidations are not the result of accompanying expansionary 
monetary expansions or currency devaluations. 
Studying the same issue, using OECD countries from 1980 to 2005 recurring to an 
OLS pooled Ahrend et.al. (2006) state that the scope for monetary policy reaction to 
consolidation efforts is defined by their credibility. Additionally, after controlling for 
reverse causality between fiscal consolidations and monetary policy, they conclude that 
fiscal consolidations based on expenditure cuts lead to a decrease in interest rate.   
Moreover, Alesina & Ardagna (2013) state the same idea of Ahrend et.al. (2006). 
They even criticise Devries et. al. (2011) narrative approach conclusions where they say 
monetary policy seem to help initial conditions by lowering interest rates.  
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An important conclusion by Afonso & Martins (2014) lies on the fact that when fiscal 
consolidations are matched by monetary easing, appears to exist some evidence of non-
Keynesian effects on government consumption and taxes, however, when not matched 
liquidity constrained households may emerge, as such, the non-Keynesian effects 
registered disappear. Basically, they added monetary episodes variable to the regression 
that studies GDP and budget components effects on private consumption, using panel 
data with fixed effects for 14 EU countries from 1970 to 2013. 
Similarly, to Alesina & Ardagna (2013) conclusions Guajardo et.al. (2014) using the 
same sample of OECD countries from 1978 to 2009 concludes that monetary policy is 
relevant, indeed interest rates fall more in spending based adjustments and monetary 
policy accounts for much the difference in output. 
Some literature tries to develop a Central Bank reaction function to Fiscal Policy 
similarly to Foresti & Marani (2013). 
That is the case of Afonso & Alves (2019) using panel data for a sample of 28 EU 
countries from 1970 until 2015. They plot the Central Bank reaction function and 
Government reaction function having observed a substitution effect between both fiscal 
policy and monetary policy, especially in cases of higher debt levels. When government 
attains high debt or public deficits Central Bank assumes a more dominant position to 
confront fiscal problem. 
Also, Banerjee & Zampoli (2019) using a Local projection method on a sample of 17 
OECD economies from 1978 to 2007 conclude fiscal consolidations do not require large 
output and employment costs provided exchange rates are flexible and monetary policy 
has sufficient room to ease. On average monetary policy is loosened after a fiscal 
consolidation. 
So, most authors agree that monetary policy may be eased after fiscal consolidation 
starts with that easing normally not happening before. 
3.METHODOLOGY  
Identifying fiscal episodes 
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In order to identify the fiscal episodes, we firstly used the same approach as Alesina 
& Ardagna (2010), where a fiscal consolidation occurs when the change in primary 
balance is greater than 1,5 percentage points where  
(1) 
𝐹𝐶1 = {
1𝑖𝑓 ∆𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐵 ≥ 1.5
0 𝑖𝑓 ∆𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐵 < 1.5
 
For the second method of identification, we relied on the approach used by Afonso 
(2010), where a fiscal consolidation occurs “when either the change in the primary 
cyclically adjusted balance is at least one and half times the standard deviation in one 
year, or when the change in the primary balance cyclically adjusted balance is at least one 

















where b is the primary structural balance as a percentage of GDP in period t and 𝜎 is 
the respective standard deviation for the panel sample while 𝛾 is applied to determine a 
multiple of the standard deviation as commonly used in the literature (𝛾 = 1,5). 
Table I shows the fiscal consolidations according to the different criteria. By 
observing the table I, we acknowledge that the number of years with Fiscal 
Consolidations for dummy variable FC1, based on Alesina & Ardagna (2010) is higher 
than for dummy variable FC2, based on Afonso (2010). But the same is not verified for 
duration, where Fiscal Consolidations identified by FC2 generally last longer than those 
identified by FC1.   
Recognizing the critiques made by recent literature of the CAPB not being able to 
fully eliminate cyclical fluctuations on GDP, we adopted a third method (FC3) based on 
Devries et.al. (2011) and Gupta et.al. (2017), a policy-based approach, that created a 
dataset for fiscal and monetary episodes which occurrence was based on policy 
documents approved in National Parliaments and statements from National Central Bank 
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of each country presented and SGP, OECD and IMF reports. In recent literature, Botta 
(2015) even points CAPB as an empirical fragility of EFC advocates. 
Again, looking at Table I, the number of Fiscal Episodes based on FC3 is significantly 
larger than those existent for FC1 and FC2 and, generally, the average duration is much 
higher than the previous two. This goes in accord with the conclusions from Afonso Leal 
(2019), that also used a narrative approach of Devries et. al. (2011) to identify Fiscal 
Episodes, having obtained 151 episodes for this approach vs. 51 episodes for CAPB 
approach. 
 
Identifying monetary episodes 
Following a similar approach used by Afonso & Martins (2014), this paper tries to 
verify if monetary expansions can explain the existence of non-Keynesian effects of fiscal 
policy. As such, we relied on 3 different methods to identify monetary episodes. 
The first method is derived from the use of the real short term interest rates, a widely 
used measure of the monetary policy easing or tightening. (Afonso & Martins (2014)) 
The second and third methods are, respectively, nominal and real effective exchange 
rate, commonly used to assess the countries competitiveness. Ardagna (2004) used the 
nominal effective exchange rate as an indicator of the monetary stance. Real effective 
exchange was included to account for differences in price differences, mainly due to 
inflation. 
We kept the same strategy used by Afonso & Martins (2014) to identify monetary 
episodes. As such, a monetary episode (monetary expansion) occurs when “the absolute 
change in one year or the average change in two years in the different indicators was 
greater than 1,5 times or 1 time the panel standard deviation” as Afonso & Martins (2014) 
state.  
Specification (3) describes the equation for identifying monetary episodes: 
(3) 
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𝜎𝑙  𝑙 = 1,2,3 
 where 𝑀𝐸𝑡
𝑙 denotes a monetary episode in period t according to criteria l; ∆𝑀𝑡
𝑙 
corresponds to the change of the indicator 1 in period t. For the real short-term interest 
rate, we have an absolute change while in the nominal and effective exchange rates we 
used the percentage changes of the respective indexes. 𝜎𝑙  stands for the panel standard 
deviation of the relevant indicator.  
From the observation of Table II, we can conclude that there are more monetary 
episodes than fiscal episodes, being more notable in the case of real short term interest 
rates (ME1), with 260 episodes. The average duration for monetary episodes varies 
significantly across episodes. In case of real short term interest rates, the average duration 
of the expansions is 4.4 years, whereas, for nominal effective rates (ME2) the average 
duration of the expansions almost 11 years,  
Our conclusions on the number of monetary episodes vs fiscal episodes match those 
from Afonso & Martins (2014), where the number of monetary episodes is also far larger 
than fiscal episodes. 
 
4. EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT 
Data 
To assess the role of monetary expansions on the success of expansionary fiscal 
consolidations we used a set of 11 countries who belong to the EMU, namely Austria, 
Belgium, Germany, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain 
and Denmark. Despite not belonging to the EMU, Sweden and United Kingdom were 
also include by their ties with the union. 
The data consists on annual time series ranging from 1970 to 2019 for private 
consumption, GDP, general government, final consumption, social transfers, taxes, 
cyclically adjusted primary balance, general government debt, revenue and expenditure, 
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taken from AMECO database, achieving a maximum of 686 observations per variable, 
throughout the entire panel. 
Core specification Model 
The approach used for assessing the impact of the fiscal consolidations on the 
existence of non-Keynesian effects of fiscal policy is, as said before, based on an 
extension of Afonso & Martins (2014) in order to incorporate a dummy variable 
accounting for the narrative approach of Devries et.al. (2011), in a dataset that is extended 
until 2017 as of Gupta et.al. (2017). 
As such, the core specification will be:  
(4) 
Δ𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝑐𝑖 + 𝜏𝐶𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜔0 𝑌𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜔1 Δ𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 
(𝛼1𝐺𝑖𝑡−1 + +𝛼3∆𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑇𝐹𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽3 ∆𝑇𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾1𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛾3∆𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑖𝑡) × 𝐹𝐶𝑖𝑡
𝑚 + 




Where 𝑖 (𝑖 = 1,… ,𝑁) indicates the different countries, 𝑡 (𝑡 = 1,… , 𝑇) stands for the 
period. We also have: 𝐶-private consumption; 𝑌- GDP;𝐺- general government final 
consumption expenditure; 𝑇𝐹 – social transfers; 𝑇𝐴𝑋- taxes. All variables displayed 
correspond to the natural logarithm of the real per capita values. 𝐹𝐶𝑚 is a dummy 
variable that identifies a fiscal consolidation episode, according to the three different 
criteria mentioned in the previous section (𝑚=1,2,3). The disturbances 𝑢𝑖𝑡 are assumed 
to be independent and identically distributed across countries with zero mean and constant 
variance.  
 
Core specification output 
Generally, the fixed effects model is a better choice than Random Effects model, as it 
is able to remove the effect of time-invariant characteristics, which, in Fixed Effects 
model, are country specific and should not be correlated with other individual features. 
As such, the only source of country heterogeneity is represented but the intercept 𝑐𝑖 in 
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specification (4) with Fixed Effects allowing for correlation between the latter and the 
repressors.  
I have used the usual Hausmann specification test to choose between Random and 
Fixed Effects model. Under this specification test, H0 is true if, in a certain regression, 
the covariance between a certain unobserved individual factor and the dependent variable 
is equal to 0, and as a result, Random Effects and Fixed Effects estimators are consistent, 
with the Random effects estimator ending up being used has its standard error is lower.  
Results for the Hausmann test indicate that, for all the regressions with the three 
different dummies, p value equals 0 for all of them, meaning, the null hypothesis is false, 
and the Fixed Effects estimator has to be used.  
Table III presents the estimation results for specification (4) according to the different 
dummies to identify fiscal consolidations episodes. Income is statistically significant for 
all the regressions, meaning, an increase in GDP will lead to an increase in private 
consumption. It is worth noting that, lagged consumption is not statistically significant 
and exhibit a positive effect on the variation of private consumption, therefore, increasing 
consumption in period t-1 also increases consumption in period t. This goes against the 
usual results from another papers, where the lagged consumption shows a negative 
elasticity to private consumption (Afonso & Martins (2014)). 
If consumers perceive an increase in Government expenditure as leading to more 
taxes in future, thus leading to a decrease in future income, consumers decrease their 
current consumption. This corresponds to the so-called Ricardian behaviour. As such, if 
there is an increase in taxes in the present, consumers will assume they will have more 
future income, so they will increase their present consumption, leading to non-Keynesian 
effects for taxes. 
In the absence of fiscal consolidations (𝐹𝐶𝑚 = 0), there is a positive statistically 
significant relationship between the first difference of taxes (∆𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑖𝑡) and private 
consumption (Δ𝐶𝑖𝑡) ((𝛾4 > 0 for all outputs), therefore, taxes exhibit non-Keynesian 
effects across all estimations based on (4). This behaviour of taxes goes in line with 
previous studies that also register non-Keynesian effects in Taxes for all the dummies 
present in their specifications (Afonso (2010); Afonso & Martins (2014)) 
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For social transfers, it is worth noting that the first difference of social transfers 
(∆𝑇𝐹𝑖𝑡) exhibits a negative statistically significant relationship to private consumption 
(𝛽4 < 0 for the first and second outputs) in the absence of fiscal consolidations (𝐹𝐶
𝑚 =
0). Thus, social transfers also register non-Keynesian effects on private consumption but 
only for specifications in (3) based on FC1 and FC2. Afonso (2010) also registered a 
negative elasticity of the first difference of social transfers in relation to private 
consumption and Afonso and Leal (2019) even conclude that social transfers appear to 
contribute the most for the creation of non-Keynesian effects. 
In the presence of fiscal consolidations (𝐹𝐶𝑚 = 1), taxes continue to exhibit non-
Keynesian effects for private consumption but only for the estimation based on FC3 
(dummy variable based on the narrative approach of Devries (2011)), with 𝛾3> 0 for the 
third output. The same results are verified for social transfers, that only register non-
Keynesian effects for the estimation based on FC3, as we can see by 𝛽3> 0 in the third 
output.  
There is a positive statistically significant elasticity of government expenditure (∆𝐺𝑖𝑡) 
in relation to private consumption in the presence of fiscal consolidations (𝐹𝐶𝑚 = 1) for 
the regression based on FC3 (𝛼3>0 in the third output).  
Thus, in the in the presence of fiscal consolidations (𝐹𝐶𝑚 = 1) results do seem a bit 
contradictory as in the presence of the narrative approach dummy (FC3), as both non-
Keynesian effects for taxes and social transfers are registered but also the usual Keynesian 
effects for government expenditure appear.  
According to Afonso & Leal (2019), that also used the narrative approach of Devries 
(2011) and Gupta (2017), in a dataset of 10 Euro Area countries for the time period 
ranging from 1978-2015, taxes exhibit non-Keynesian effects for private consumption 
under austerity policies (𝐹𝐶𝑚 = 1), as such, taxes can present Ricardian behaviour. Also, 
they add that exists a positive statistically significant elasticity for government 
expenditure in relation to private consumption (usual Keynesian effects). Thus, our 
results also using the narrative approach do seem to confirm Afonso and Leal (2019) 
results under the presence of Fiscal Consolidations (𝐹𝐶𝑚 = 1) 
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Comparing to the literature that used only the CAPB approach, we can confirm 
Afonso (2010) results on the positive long run effect, that an increase in taxes combined 
with a Fiscal Consolidation, has in private consumption and the presence of Ricardian 
Behaviour in taxes under austerity policies (Afonso & Leal (2019). However, we do not 
find any non-Keynesian effects of government expenditure in private consumption under 
Fiscal Consolidations (𝐹𝐶𝑚 = 1), the elasticity is even positive, signalling the usual 
Keynesian effects, confirming similar results of Afonso & Martins (2014). 
 
ME specification output 
We departed from Afonso and Martins (2014) specification and, so we also added 
each country´s monetary developments to the specification (4). Our analysis extends the 
approach of Afonso and Martins (2014) because it adds a dummy accounting for the 
narrative approach of Devries et. al. (2011). 

















𝜎𝑙  𝑙 = 1,2,3 
𝑀𝐸𝑡
𝑙 denotes a monetary episode in period t according to criteria l; ∆𝑀𝑡
𝑙 corresponds 
to the change of the indicator 1 in period t. For the real short-term interest rate, we have 
an absolute change while in the nominal and effective exchange rates we used the 
percentage changes of the respective indexes. 𝜎𝑙 stands for the panel standard deviation 
of the relevant indicator. 
 
As such specification (5) is as follows:  
(5) 
Δ𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝑐𝑖 + 𝜏𝐶𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜔0 𝑌𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜔1 Δ𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 
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(𝛼10𝐺𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼30𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝑇𝐹𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽30 𝑇𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾10𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛾30𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑖𝑡 +
𝜂50Δ𝑀𝑖𝑡
𝑙 ) × 𝐹𝐶𝑖𝑡
𝑚𝑀𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝑙 + 
(𝛼20𝐺𝑖𝑡−1 + +𝛼40𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽20𝑇𝐹𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽40 𝑇𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾20𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛾40𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑖𝑡 +
𝜂60Δ𝑀𝑖𝑡
𝑙 ) ×  (1−𝐹𝐶𝑖𝑡
𝑚)𝑀𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝑙  + 
(𝛼11𝐺𝑖𝑡−1 + +𝛼31𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11𝑇𝐹𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽31 𝑇𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾11𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛾31𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑖𝑡 +
𝜂51Δ𝑀𝑖𝑡
𝑙 ) × 𝐹𝐶𝑖𝑡
𝑚(1 −𝑀𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝑙 ) + 
(𝛼21𝐺𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼41𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽21𝑇𝐹𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽41 𝑇𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾21𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛾41𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑖𝑡 +
𝜂61Δ𝑀𝑖𝑡
𝑙 ) × (1 − 𝐹𝐶𝑖𝑡
𝑚)(1 −𝑀𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝑙 ) + 𝜇𝑚  
In addition to the variables previously explained, 𝑀𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝑙  denotes a monetary expansion 
in period 𝑡 
(𝑡 = 1,… , 𝑇) for country 𝑖 (i=1,…,N) according to the criteria 𝑙 (𝑙 = 1,2,3). Δ𝑀𝑙 
corresponds to the relevant indicator used to compute monetary episodes in (3). 
Table IV presents the results for specification (5). 
We verify that, as in Core Specification, Income continues to be statistically 
significant for all the results (𝜔0 and 𝜔1 >0 for all outputs).  
In the absence of monetary expansions and fiscal consolidations (𝐹𝐶𝑚 = 0 ;𝑀𝑋𝑙 =
0), the non-Keynesian effects of taxes and social transfers continue to be verified for 
almost all the regressions in specification (5), as happened in specification (4). As such 
we can verify that, for social transfers 𝛽41<0 for some outputs and, for taxes, 𝛾41 > 0 for 
all outputs.  
For the presence of monetary expansions and absence of fiscal consolidations 
(𝐹𝐶𝑚 = 0 ;𝑀𝑋𝑙 = 1), taxes register non-Keynesian effects only for regression based on 
ME1 (real short-term interest rate), as such, 𝛾41 > 0 for output based on dummy variable 
ME1. 
For the presence of fiscal consolidations and absence of monetary expansions 
(𝐹𝐶𝑚 = 1 ;𝑀𝑋𝑙 = 0), 𝛼31 > 0  for almost all outputs, meaning, government expenditure 
verifies non-Keynesian effects for almost all regressions in specification (5). These results 
differ from specification (4) where non-Keynesian effects for government expenditure 
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where only statistically significant for the regression based on FC3 (dummy for the 
narrative approach of Devries et. al. (2011) and Gupta et.al. (2017)). 
Most importantly, in the presence of both fiscal consolidations and monetary 
expansions (𝐹𝐶𝑚 = 1 ;𝑀𝑋𝑙 = 1), there is concurrent evidence of some Keynesian 
effects for lagged taxes on private consumption (𝛾10<0 for ME2, FC1 output) and some 
non-Keynesian effects for taxes on private consumption (𝛾30>0 for ME1, FC3 output). 
Lagged taxes register a negative elasticity to private consumption at 10% statistical 
significance level only for regression based on dummies FC1 and ME2. Taxes register 
non-Keynesian effects in private consumption at 10% statistical significance only for 
regression based on FC3 and ME1, meaning that, as in core specification (4) there still 
exist some evidence of non-Keynesian effects for the regression based on narrative 
approach (FC3 dummy) under a fiscal consolidation episode combined with a monetary 
expansion. 
In relation to government expenditure, we can verify that, contrary to Afonso and 
Martins (2014), under a combination of austerity policies and monetary expansions 
((𝐹𝐶𝑚 = 1 ;𝑀𝑋𝑙 = 1), there is no statistically significant evidence of government 
expenditure, having a negative elasticity to private consumption (meaning, having non-
Keynesian effects), or even a positive one (the usual Keynesian effects). These results 
diverge from those of specification (4) results where, under the narrative approach, 
government expenditure exhibited the usual Keynesian effects under Fiscal 
Consolidations.   
As such, our specification (5) results as a whole seem to confirm that, successful and 
expansionary fiscal consolidations are not the result of accompanying Monetary Policy 
or devaluations, as stated by Ardagna (2004).  
Table V summarises the robustness testes computed for specification (5).  
Conditions for Success of Fiscal Consolidations 
In order to assess what are the factors that may contribute for the success of fiscal 
consolidations we recurred to two different dummy variables based on the same approach 
used by Afonso & Martins (2014). 
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The first dummy SU1 is based on Afonso & Jalles (2012) “who define a fiscal 
consolidation as being successful if the change in the cyclically adjusted primary balance 
𝑏𝑡 for two consecutive years is greater than the standard deviation 𝜎 of the full panel 










The second dummy SU2 is based on a measure computed by Alesina & Ardagna 
(2013) based on the level of debt as a percentage of GDP. A fiscal consolidation is 
successful if “the debt-to GDP ratio two years after the end of the fiscal adjustment 
(𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑡+2) is lower than the debt-to GDP ratio is lower than the debt-to-GDP ratio in the 








We have also used the same dummy variables of Afonso & Martins (2014) to assess 
the leading option of fiscal consolidation- expenditure or revenue based. As stated in 
Afonso & Martins (2014): “a Fiscal Consolidation in period 𝑡 is expenditure based (𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑡) 
if the change in the cyclically adjusted total expenditure of the general government as a 
percentage of GDP in that period (Δ𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑡) accounts for a proportion greater than 𝜆 of the 
change in the cyclically adjusted primary balance (Δ𝑏𝑡)”:  
(8) 
𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑡 = {
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where 𝜆 is meant to represent the composition of the adjustment for three different 
thresholds, so that 𝜆 assumes the values of 1/2, 2/3 and 3/4.  A similar process was used 
to compute revenue based consolidations.  
We have estimated a Probit model that intends to assess if “the reported differences 
between the expenditure and revenue based consolidations are statistically relevant and 
impinge on the success of the fiscal adjustments” (Afonso & Martins (2014))  
 
(9) 
𝑃𝑟𝑖(𝑆𝑈 = 1|𝑍𝑖) = 𝐸[𝑆𝑈 = 1|𝑍𝑖] = Φ(𝑍𝑖) 
where  𝐸[𝑆𝑈 = 1|𝑍𝑖] is the conditional expectation of the success of the fiscal 
consolidation, given 𝑍𝑖 and 𝑆𝑈 refers to the dummy variables defined on (6) and (7). 
Equation (10) describes 𝑍𝑖 as follows:  
(10) 
𝑍𝑖 = 𝛿1 + 𝛿2𝐷𝑖 + 𝛿3Δ𝑏𝑖 + 𝛿4𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖 + 𝛿5𝑀𝑋𝑖 
 
where 𝐷𝑖 is the duration of the fiscal consolidation, Δ𝑏𝑖 refers to the change in the 
cyclically adjusted primary balance, accounting for the size of fiscal consolidation. 𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖 
is the dummy variable defined in (8) that accounts for expenditure based consolidations 
and 𝑀𝑋𝑖 refers to the dummy variable used to account for monetary expansions (MX1 
for a decrease in real short term interest rates, MX2 and MX3, respectively, for nominal 
and real effective currency depreciations)  
Table VI shows the results for the success measure constructed by Afonso & Jalles 
(2012). 
For the first measure of success, SU1, based on Afonso & Jalles (2012), we can see 
that duration and size of fiscal consolidations play a statistically significant positive role 
on the success of fiscal consolidation.  Similar to Afonso and Martins (2014), these results 
hold across for either FC1, FC2, FC3.  
In terms of composition of fiscal consolidations, results are not linear and are even 
contradictory. For the specification based on dummy FC1, expenditure based 
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consolidations are the only to contribute for success of fiscal consolidations, as happens 
in Alesina & Ardagna (2013). For FC2, both expenditure based and revenue based 
consolidations contribute for success of fiscal consolidations. Finally, for specification 
based on dummy FC3, both expenditure based and revenue based consolidations do not 
play a statistically significant role on the existence of fiscal consolidations, similar to 
Afonso & Martins (2014). 
Regarding the role of monetary developments in the FC2 case, for the first measures 
of success SU1 we can see that ME3 (real terms devaluation) contributes negatively for 
the success of fiscal consolidations. These results go in line with those of Ardagna (2004), 
that analysing a sample of concluded that successful and expansionary fiscal 
consolidations are not the result of accompanying monetary policy or even currency 
depreciation. Alesina et al. (2019) even state that expenditure based consolidations 
contribute for success of fiscal consolidations independently of accompanying policies 
(such as monetary policy, structural reforms, currency depreciation).  
For the second measure of success SU2, based on Alesina & Ardagna (2013), duration 
and size do not play a statistically significant role on success of fiscal consolidation, as 
measured by the evolution of the Debt/GDP ratio. 
Expenditure based consolidations seem to be the only to contribute for a reduction of 
Debt/GDP ratio across all specifications FC1, FC2, FC3, thus, contribute for the success 
of fiscal consolidations measured by criteria SU2. These results confirm Alesina Ardagna 
(2013), where they concluded that expenditure-based consolidations where those more 
likely to lead to a reduction of Debt/GDP ratio.  
In terms of the role of monetary policy in the SU2 case, we can see that all the three 
monetary dummies, MX1, MX2 and MX3, give a statistically significant negative 
contribution for success of fiscal consolidations, reinforcing and even going further of 
Afonso & Martins (2014) conclusions of the negative effect of MX2 in the success of 
fiscal consolidations.  
Our results conclude that even with a dummy variable accounting for the narrative 
approach of Devries et.al. (2011) and Gupta et.al. (2017), instead of using the usual CAPB 
approach, monetary policy still contributes negatively for the success of fiscal 
consolidations. It contradicts the usual idea in recent literature using narrative approach, 
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and concluding that monetary policy contributes for success of fiscal consolidations just 






Our paper tried to answer the research question: Can Monetary Policy easing explain 
the non-Keynesian effects of Fiscal Policy? The regressions computed in this paper 
recourse to the usual dummies for identify fiscal consolidation but complement this 
analysis with a two-fold approach:  extend the regression to accommodate dummies to 
identify monetary expansions as in Afonso & Martins (2014) and insert a dummy variable 
that accounts for the narrative approach of Devries et.al. (2011) and Gupta et.al. (2017) 
to identify fiscal consolidations. 
The Fixed Effects panel estimations conducted for 14 EMU countries, show that, in 
the presence of a fiscal consolidation not combined with a monetary expansion, there is 
no evidence of non-Keynesian effects. Importantly, the results for the specification 
accommodating the narrative approach are contradictory, having in mind that both 
Keynesian effects for Government expenditure and non-Keynesian effects for taxes are 
verified.  
However, in the absence of Fiscal Consolidations, there is evidence of non-Keynesian 
effects, in line with results from previous literature.  
Accommodating monetary expansions through a new specification, we can conclude 
that when fiscal consolidations are matched by a monetary expansion there is little 
evidence of non-Keynesian effects. Thus, we can conclude that, monetary expansions do 
not play a role on the existence of expansionary fiscal consolidations. 
Using a Probit Model to assess the probability of success of fiscal consolidations, we 
can even acknowledge that monetary developments contribute negatively for success of 
fiscal consolidations. Also, duration and size play a statistically significant role on success 
of fiscal consolidation. As previous literature states, we can confirm that expenditure-
based consolidation contribute for success of fiscal consolidations, especially in terms of 
the evolution of Debt-to-GDP ratio. 
Having in mind 2020 was a year of further substantial and spectacular increases in 
asset purchases programs by the FED and the ECB, for further research it would be 
interesting to include a variable accounting for the existence and magnitude of Asset 
Purchase Programs (most know as Quantitative Easing). This would allow a more 
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complete identification of monetary expansions in all its stances and would retest the 
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Table I - Identification of the fiscal episodes according to the different criteria (1970-2019) 
  FC1 FC2 FC3 
Country Consolidations Consolidations Consolidations 
Austria 84,96,97,01,05,15 84,96 
80,81,84,96,97,01,02,11,12,1
5 











France 96 95 
79,87,91,95,96,97,11,12,13,1
4,15 





10,11,13,14,16   
















Spain 10,13 10,12,13 
83,84,89,92,93,94,95,96,97,0
9,10,11,12,13,14,15 
Sweden 96 95,96 84,93,94,95,96.97,98 




Episodes 76 60 160 
Average 
duration of 
episodes 1,55 1,93 4,58 
Source: author´s computations. Notes: FC1 - Measure based on Alesina (2010); FC2 - Measure 
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Table II - Identification of the monetary episodes according to the different criteria 
(1970-2019) 
  ME1 ME2 ME3 





8,09  77,78 
Belgium 
70,73,74,75,76,77,78,81,82,84,85,86,9
2,93,02,05,08,09   77,78 
Denmark 
70,71,72,73,74,75,76,77,78,79,80,81,8






France 70,73,75,79,80,88,92,94,95,02,08,09     








































Episodes 260 64 34 
Average 
duration of 
episodes 4,45 10,78 2,11 
Source: author´s computations. Notes: ME1 - Measure based on the changes in the real 
short-term interest rate; ME2 - Measure based on changes in the real effective exchange 
rate; ME3 - Measure based on the changes in the nominal effective exchange rate.  
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Table III- Fixed effects estimation results for specification (4) 
      FC1 FC2 FC3 




 0.013 0.007 0.025 




 0.246*** 0.244*** 0.238*** 




 0.111*** 0.121*** 0.112*** 





0.054 0.050 0.060 




0.067 0.080 0.033 




-0.001 -0.002 0.051 




-0.126** -0.118** -0.074 




0.035 0.047 -0.009 




0.264*** 0.239*** 0.251*** 





0.004 -0.079 -0.013 




0.222 0.246 0.200* 




0.005 0.217 -0.094 




-0.043 0.045 -0.194* 




0.028 -0.051 0.155 




0.168 0.159 0.258*** 
    (0.125) (0.128) (0.089) 
  Constant   130.663** 125.964** 125.078** 
      (54.317) (53.902) (54.333) 
 Observations  686 686 686 
 R-squared  0.115 0.120 0.123 
  Number of Country   14 14 14 
      
Notes: Used robust heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors. The t-statistics are in parentheses. 
*,**,*** denotes statiscally significant at a 10,5,1 percent level, respectively. FC1- Measure based on 
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FC1,ME1 FC2,ME1 FC3,ME1 FC1,ME2 FC2,ME2 FC3,ME2 FC1,ME3 FC2,ME3 FC3,ME3
VARIABLES varlnC varlnC varlnC varlnC varlnC varlnC varlnC varlnC varlnC
0.025 0.008 0.023 0.072 0.065 0.078 0.023 0.024 0.042
(0.059) (0.060) (0.060) (0.068) (0.068) (0.069) (0.058) (0.058) (0.059)
0.274*** 0.271*** 0.270*** 0.251*** 0.251*** 0.244*** 0.240*** 0.236*** 0.232***
(0.070) (0.070) (0.070) (0.070) (0.069) (0.069) (0.069) (0.068) (0.068)
0.098** 0.110** 0.100** 0.129*** 0.136*** 0.128*** 0.108** 0.117*** 0.111***
(0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.044) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.042) (0.042)
0.054 0.043 0.095 0.055 0.051 0.060 0.056 0.068 0.084
(0.072) (0.073) (0.079) (0.058) (0.058) (0.062) (0.059) (0.059) (0.063)
0.073 0.108 0.067 0.071 0.087 0.039 0.074 0.092 0.040
(0.072) (0.072) (0.078) (0.061) (0.061) (0.067) (0.060) (0.060) (0.065)
0.012 0.016 0.051 -0.017 -0.013 0.039 -0.010 -0.008 0.043
(0.057) (0.056) (0.065) (0.052) (0.050) (0.059) (0.051) (0.049) (0.058)
-0.112 -0.105 -0.067 -0.128** -0.108* -0.069 -0.146** -0.129** -0.085
(0.069) (0.069) (0.074) (0.059) (0.058) (0.062) (0.059) (0.058) (0.062)
0.018 0.043 -0.031 0.026 0.042 -0.019 0.042 0.047 -0.017
(0.072) (0.072) (0.077) (0.061) (0.061) (0.065) (0.060) (0.059) (0.063)
0.325*** 0.299*** 0.314*** 0.247*** 0.233*** 0.239*** 0.272*** 0.244*** 0.253***
(0.068) (0.067) (0.073) (0.059) (0.056) (0.060) (0.058) (0.056) (0.059)
-0.005 -0.020 0.002 0.015 -0.006 0.023 0.021 0.007 0.033
(0.051) (0.051) (0.056) (0.044) (0.043) (0.046) (0.042) (0.041) (0.044)
0.069 0.077 0.029 -0.341 -0.110 -0.288 -0.149 -0.292 -0.302
(0.091) (0.088) (0.097) (1.637) (1.672) (1.645) (0.255) (0.233) (0.236)
0.074 0.049 -0.002 0.012 -0.010 -0.015 0.020 0.060 0.053
(0.101) (0.101) (0.109) (0.297) (0.302) (0.320) (0.366) (0.361) (0.409)
-0.057 -0.052 0.034 0.177 0.188 0.217 0.280 0.361 0.376
(0.087) (0.080) (0.097) (0.368) (0.368) (0.376) (0.268) (0.243) (0.251)
-0.155 -0.106 -0.062 -0.154 -0.199 -0.127 0.012 -0.077 -0.090
(0.096) (0.093) (0.102) (0.300) (0.313) (0.326) (0.243) (0.247) (0.300)
0.057 0.052 -0.006 0.256 0.033 0.190 -0.037 0.063 0.048
(0.083) (0.083) (0.087) (1.674) (1.711) (1.686) (0.220) (0.219) (0.228)
0.141 0.141* 0.150* 0.286 0.342 0.301 -0.038 0.128 0.184
(0.088) (0.085) (0.086) (0.240) (0.276) (0.244) (0.289) (0.286) (0.303)
0.101 0.085 0.113* 0.115 0.122 0.109 0.094 0.045 0.051
(0.066) (0.065) (0.067) (0.144) (0.145) (0.148) (0.187) (0.179) (0.191)
0.250 -0.010 -0.059 -0.036 -0.115 -0.020 -0.017 -0.238 -0.067
(0.240) (0.278) (0.132) (0.141) (0.167) (0.105) (0.148) (0.170) (0.106)
0.812*** 0.380 0.231 0.267 0.268 0.200* 0.298* 0.347* 0.211*
(0.251) (0.310) (0.161) (0.162) (0.179) (0.120) (0.163) (0.179) (0.120)
-0.228 0.209 -0.050 0.007 0.204 -0.102 -0.022 0.210 -0.093
(0.226) (0.302) (0.095) (0.131) (0.172) (0.076) (0.133) (0.169) (0.075)
-0.157 0.036 -0.181 0.006 0.063 -0.168 -0.002 0.002 -0.185*
(0.195) (0.234) (0.133) (0.159) (0.192) (0.108) (0.154) (0.178) (0.109)
0.164 -0.126 0.178 0.183 0.016 0.202* 0.194 0.158 0.260**
(0.194) (0.202) (0.130) (0.148) (0.151) (0.103) (0.150) (0.152) (0.103)
0.129 0.180 0.327*** 0.183 0.139 0.268*** 0.200 0.216 0.303***
(0.164) (0.193) (0.118) (0.131) (0.139) (0.093) (0.129) (0.135) (0.092)
-0.335** -0.065 -0.064 -0.177* -0.009 -0.062 -0.159 -0.065 -0.064
(0.163) (0.186) (0.095) (0.107) (0.122) (0.079) (0.106) (0.119) (0.078)
0.041 -0.109 0.106 0.705 0.789 0.562 21.601 0.500 0.702
(0.177) (0.241) (0.159) (0.600) (1.039) (0.599) (25.361) (0.716) (1.574)
-0.109 0.136 0.097 0.117 0.150 0.055 -2.662 0.146 0.058
(0.217) (0.281) (0.187) (0.877) (0.823) (1.038) (3.279) (0.800) (2.829)
-0.107 0.202 -0.100 0.653 0.903 0.251 213.708 -1.300 0.308
(0.219) (0.250) (0.126) (0.660) (2.536) (0.400) (249.257) (1.411) (2.215)
0.034 0.136 -0.094 -0.110 -0.094 -0.129 24.800 -0.335 -0.231
(0.228) (0.266) (0.165) (0.501) (0.471) (0.587) (28.216) (0.950) (2.613)
0.047 0.063 0.186 -0.792* -0.801 -0.735 -83.899 0.000 -0.618
(0.208) (0.206) (0.155) (0.439) (0.510) (0.488) (97.357) (0.000) (1.119)
0.306 0.136 0.247* 0.000 -0.188 0.331 0.000 0.000 0.048
(0.221) (0.210) (0.149) (0.000) (1.629) (0.450) (0.000) (0.000) (2.883)
-0.026 -0.031 -0.106 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.159) (0.167) (0.130) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant 111.865** 107.155* 100.895* 106.226* 97.916* 96.484 124.914** 115.979** 109.947*
(56.597) (57.339) (57.428) (58.684) (58.375) (59.164) (55.993) (55.528) (56.048)
Observations 686 686 686 686 686 686 686 686 686
R-squared 0.143 0.132 0.141 0.129 0.130 0.134 0.132 0.141 0.146
Number of Country 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
Table IV- Fixed Effects estimation for specification (5)
Notes:  Used robust heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors. The t-statistics are in parentheses. *,**,*** denotes statiscally significant at a 10,5,1 percent level, respectively. ME1- 
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Table V- Robustness results for estimations based on specification (5) 
Sample restriction Summary Results 
Sample with "central-
European" countries 
Some evidence of non-Keynesian effects for taxes and 
social transfers in the absence of both fiscal 
consolidations and monetary Expansions. In the 
presence of fiscal consolidations only, there is some 
evidence of non-Keynesian effects for taxes under 
FC3 only, and some keynesian effects for government 
expenditure. In the presence of Monetary Expansions 
only, taxes continue to verify some non-Keynesian 
effects. In the presence of both Fiscal Consolidations 
and Monetary Expansion, there exists no evidence of 
non-keynesian effects for taxes. Lagged taxes even 
exhibit Keynesian effects for specification based on 
FC1, ME2. Could not compute some estimations due 






Under a fiscal consolidation combined with a 
monetary expansion there continues to exist little 
evidence of non-Keynesian effects for any of the 
independent variables in the regression. Lagged taxes 
continue to exhibit Keynesian effects for specification 
based on FC1, ME2. Could not compute some 






It is worth noting that in the absence of fiscal 
consolidations and monetary expansions, taxes and 
social transfers continue to exhibit the same usual 
non-Keynesian effects, but, despite that, Government 
expenditure now registers some Keynesian effects for 
specification based on FC2, ME3 and FC3, ME3.  The 
same Keynesian effects are verified for social 
transfers, in the presence of monetary expansions, 
only for specifications based on FC2, ME3 and FC3, 
ME3; despite that new fact, taxes continuing to exibit 
non-Keynesian effects. Most importantly, under a 
fiscal consolidation and a monetary expansion, we 
have evidence of Keynesian effects for taxes and 
government expenditure. One estimation could not 






When we have the presence of fiscal consolidation 
not combined with monetary expansions there is no 
evidence of non-Keynesian effects of taxes. Lagged 
taxes register some keynesian effects for the 
specification based on FC1, ME2 when a Fiscal 
Consolidation is matched with a Monetary Expansion. 





     
Notes: "Central European" include all but Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain, 
which are labelled as peripheral countries. 
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Table VI- Sucess of fiscal consolidations for SU1 based on FC2 
 Expenditure Revenue 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES SU1 SU1 SU1 SU1 SU1 SU1 
              
 
 2.926*** 2.927*** 2.920*** 3.004*** 3.002*** 3.000*** 
 (0.567) (0.565) (0.563) (0.560) (0.558) (0.557) 
 
 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
 
 0.467**      
 (0.215)      
 
 -0.427 -0.469 -0.452 -0.616 -0.618 -0.614 
 (0.454) (0.458) (0.464) (0.452) (0.453) (0.455) 
 
 -0.413 -0.414 -0.424 -0.452 -0.464 -0.468 















 (0.569) (0.567) (0.568) (0.564) (0.562) (0.562) 
 
  0.364*     
  (0.215)     
 
   0.412*    
   (0.220)    
 
    0.479**   
    (0.229)   
 
     0.513**  
     (0.227)  
 
      0.520** 














 (0.652) (0.612) (0.624) (0.680) (0.688) (0.688) 
Observations 686 686 686 686 686 686 
Notes: Used robust heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors. The t-statistics are in parentheses. 
*,**,*** denotes statistically significant at a 10,5,1 percent level, respectively. 12, 23 and 34 next to 
exp and rev refer to the relevant variable for ,according to (8) 
GONÇALO QUARESMA  MONETARY POLICY EASING AND NON-






Table VII- Sucess of fiscal consolidations for SU2 based on FC3 
 Expenditure Revenue 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES SU2 SU2 SU2 SU2 SU2 SU2 
              
 
 -0.017 -0.017 -0.017 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
 0.411**      
 (0.168)      
 
 -0.202* -0.204* -0.204* -0.222** -0.221** -0.223** 
 (0.105) (0.104) (0.104) (0.104) (0.104) (0.104) 
 
 -0.576*** -0.577*** -0.581*** -0.603*** -0.601*** -0.604*** 
 (0.197) (0.197) (0.197) (0.196) (0.196) (0.196) 
 
 -0.593** -0.598** -0.602** -0.591** -0.590** -0.591** 
 (0.274) (0.274) (0.274) (0.269) (0.270) (0.269) 
 
  0.434**     
  (0.173)     
 
   0.433**    
   (0.178)    
 
    -0.009   
    (0.143)   
 
     0.021  
     (0.145)  
 
      -0.038 
      (0.147) 
Constant -0.151 -0.156 -0.160 -0.173 -0.172 -0.174 
 (0.111) (0.111) (0.111) (0.111) (0.111) (0.111) 
Observations 686 686 686 686 686 686 
Notes: Used robust heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors. The t-statistics are in 
parentheses. *,**,*** denotes statistically significant at a 10,5,1 percent level, respectively. 
12, 23 and 34 next to exp and rev refer to the relevant variable for , according to (8) 
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